ÐаÑбоÑа
doesn't know REAL wrestling...
The recent accusations of destruction of ancient sites in Iraq by western forces have once again brought a controversial subject to public attention.
Is it ever permissible to destroy a site or building of historical value because of possible military applications?
I could focus on the damage done by insurgents and the US-led coalition forces to ancient Mesopotamian sites but I have no desire to get mired in the controversy surrounding the war in Iraq. Instead I have chosen to look at another contentious episode to involve Anglo-American forces but this time from the Second World War the bombing of the ancient abbey of Monte Cassino.
By early 1944, the Allied invasion of Italy had lost momentum. Mountainous terrain combined with well-prepared defences by the German commander, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, had reduced the two-pronged to a slow and at times murderous crawl. Pressure to break through Kesselrings Gustav Line was increased by the Allied landings at Anzio, over 60 miles behind the German defensive line and a mere 35 miles from Rome. The Germans had quickly encircled the Anzio beachhead and without proper reinforcement Major-General John Lucas US VI Corps faced being grounded out of existence by the larger German Fourteenth Army of General Mackensen.
This brought the showdown between General Mark Clarks US Fifth Army and General Vietinghoffs German Tenth Army into sharp focus. Of particular interest were the small town of Cassino and the hill that overlooked it, Monte Cassino. As can be seen from the link below, the top of Monte Cassino affords an excellent view of the valley below so any attempts to move on Cassino itself would have been under intense scrutiny.
View from atop Monte Cassino
That in itself constituted enough of a military problem for the Allies as the German Gustav Line incorporated much of the surrounding area. However, what makes this whole affair so contentious is that on top of Monte Cassino stood a Benedictine monastery that could trace its heritage back to the 6th century.
Because of its historical significance, Kesselring had ordered German units not to include the monastery itself as part of the Gustav Line and had informed the Allies thus. However, the Allied commander of the New Zealand II Corps that was to form the spearhead of the attempt to relieve Anzio, Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg, along with Major-General F.S. Tucker of the Indian Fourth Division, felt that the abbey posed a major threat to Allied interests should the Germans occupy it. One officer stated that Wherever you went, there was the monastery, looking at you
Freybergs request for an aerial bombardment of the monastery was rejected by General Clark, who suggested that not only did such an act contravene an existing agreement with Keeselring but the monastery had become a refuge for many of the inhabitants of Cassino itself. The killing of innocents would hand the Germans a propaganda victory that Hitlers master manipulator Joseph Goebbels would exploit to the fullest. However, Clarks most important argument from a military standpoint was that turning the monastery into rubble would create even stronger fortifications for the Germans, who would undoubtedly occupy the monastery once the Allies had bombed it.
Reconnaissance aircraft were sent for a low-altitude pass and suggested evidence of German troops already inside the monastery, something that Freyberg already contended. The Allied commander-in-chief for Italy, General Sir Harold Alexander, chose to err on the side of caution. Not willing to take the chance that the Germans were already in the monastery, Alexander authorised Freybergs request and on 15th February 1944, two waves of bombers wiped out centuries of history.
A far-sighted German Lieutenant Colonel Julius Schlegel transferred the monasterys library which included centuries-old manuscripts of Cicero, Horace, Virgil and Seneca as well as numerous masterpieces by Titian, Raphael, Tintoretto and Leonardo da Vinci to the Vatican so the cultural price the bombing was not a high as it might have been. However, a building of immense historical significance had been obliterated for little or no strategic or tactical gain, not to mention the deaths of Italian citizens and monks who had sought safety within its walls.
In the aftermath, General Clarks fear was realised as the German First Parachute Regiment occupied the ruins and turned it into a fortress. No amount of Allied attacks could dislodge the entrenched Germans over the next three months at the cost of up to 2,000 Allied lives. The monastery was only abandoned when the Gustav Line was breached elsewhere, leaving a regiment of the Polish Twelfth Podolian Uhlans to occupy what was left of the monastery uncontested.
In the years after, it was gradually established that there were no German soldiers stationed in the monastery prior to the bombing.
I can understand the potential need to destroy treasured sites during warfare but on this occasion I do not fully understand the thinking behind the bombing. I think the overall commander, General Alexander, should be absolved of blame even if he authorised the destruction for he was trusting the report of his man on the ground.
As for Freybergs reasons for pressing for the bombing, he may well have been convinced that there were Germans within the walls of the monastery but he must have realised that such a structure would have absorbed enough of the damage for a bombing run to inflict only limited losses on any occupying forces. The survival of the majority of the civilians and monks who had taken shelter in the monastery further suggests that dug-in German soldiers would only have incurred limited losses.
Ultimately, the arguments leading to the destruction of the monastery rest on its potential threat rather than its actual state of occupation. Perhaps anti-German propaganda in the western press made Allied officers more willing to view their opponents as the dastardly and treacherous Hun. Monte Cassino was a potentially formidable impediment and Freyberg did not want to take the chance that Field Marshal Kesselring might be overruled by his untrustworthy superiors, who might not have been so willing to protect historical monuments after the Italians had defected.
I think in this case the destruction of the monastery could easily and should have been avoided. I understand that in times of war hasty decisions can be made but perhaps on this occasion Freyberg and his officers had put too much faith in the maxim Whoever masters the hills, masters the valleys and neglected to see the consequences of their actions.
Is it ever permissible to destroy a site or building of historical value because of possible military applications?
I could focus on the damage done by insurgents and the US-led coalition forces to ancient Mesopotamian sites but I have no desire to get mired in the controversy surrounding the war in Iraq. Instead I have chosen to look at another contentious episode to involve Anglo-American forces but this time from the Second World War the bombing of the ancient abbey of Monte Cassino.
By early 1944, the Allied invasion of Italy had lost momentum. Mountainous terrain combined with well-prepared defences by the German commander, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, had reduced the two-pronged to a slow and at times murderous crawl. Pressure to break through Kesselrings Gustav Line was increased by the Allied landings at Anzio, over 60 miles behind the German defensive line and a mere 35 miles from Rome. The Germans had quickly encircled the Anzio beachhead and without proper reinforcement Major-General John Lucas US VI Corps faced being grounded out of existence by the larger German Fourteenth Army of General Mackensen.
This brought the showdown between General Mark Clarks US Fifth Army and General Vietinghoffs German Tenth Army into sharp focus. Of particular interest were the small town of Cassino and the hill that overlooked it, Monte Cassino. As can be seen from the link below, the top of Monte Cassino affords an excellent view of the valley below so any attempts to move on Cassino itself would have been under intense scrutiny.
View from atop Monte Cassino
That in itself constituted enough of a military problem for the Allies as the German Gustav Line incorporated much of the surrounding area. However, what makes this whole affair so contentious is that on top of Monte Cassino stood a Benedictine monastery that could trace its heritage back to the 6th century.
Because of its historical significance, Kesselring had ordered German units not to include the monastery itself as part of the Gustav Line and had informed the Allies thus. However, the Allied commander of the New Zealand II Corps that was to form the spearhead of the attempt to relieve Anzio, Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg, along with Major-General F.S. Tucker of the Indian Fourth Division, felt that the abbey posed a major threat to Allied interests should the Germans occupy it. One officer stated that Wherever you went, there was the monastery, looking at you
Freybergs request for an aerial bombardment of the monastery was rejected by General Clark, who suggested that not only did such an act contravene an existing agreement with Keeselring but the monastery had become a refuge for many of the inhabitants of Cassino itself. The killing of innocents would hand the Germans a propaganda victory that Hitlers master manipulator Joseph Goebbels would exploit to the fullest. However, Clarks most important argument from a military standpoint was that turning the monastery into rubble would create even stronger fortifications for the Germans, who would undoubtedly occupy the monastery once the Allies had bombed it.
Reconnaissance aircraft were sent for a low-altitude pass and suggested evidence of German troops already inside the monastery, something that Freyberg already contended. The Allied commander-in-chief for Italy, General Sir Harold Alexander, chose to err on the side of caution. Not willing to take the chance that the Germans were already in the monastery, Alexander authorised Freybergs request and on 15th February 1944, two waves of bombers wiped out centuries of history.
A far-sighted German Lieutenant Colonel Julius Schlegel transferred the monasterys library which included centuries-old manuscripts of Cicero, Horace, Virgil and Seneca as well as numerous masterpieces by Titian, Raphael, Tintoretto and Leonardo da Vinci to the Vatican so the cultural price the bombing was not a high as it might have been. However, a building of immense historical significance had been obliterated for little or no strategic or tactical gain, not to mention the deaths of Italian citizens and monks who had sought safety within its walls.
In the aftermath, General Clarks fear was realised as the German First Parachute Regiment occupied the ruins and turned it into a fortress. No amount of Allied attacks could dislodge the entrenched Germans over the next three months at the cost of up to 2,000 Allied lives. The monastery was only abandoned when the Gustav Line was breached elsewhere, leaving a regiment of the Polish Twelfth Podolian Uhlans to occupy what was left of the monastery uncontested.
In the years after, it was gradually established that there were no German soldiers stationed in the monastery prior to the bombing.
I can understand the potential need to destroy treasured sites during warfare but on this occasion I do not fully understand the thinking behind the bombing. I think the overall commander, General Alexander, should be absolved of blame even if he authorised the destruction for he was trusting the report of his man on the ground.
As for Freybergs reasons for pressing for the bombing, he may well have been convinced that there were Germans within the walls of the monastery but he must have realised that such a structure would have absorbed enough of the damage for a bombing run to inflict only limited losses on any occupying forces. The survival of the majority of the civilians and monks who had taken shelter in the monastery further suggests that dug-in German soldiers would only have incurred limited losses.
Ultimately, the arguments leading to the destruction of the monastery rest on its potential threat rather than its actual state of occupation. Perhaps anti-German propaganda in the western press made Allied officers more willing to view their opponents as the dastardly and treacherous Hun. Monte Cassino was a potentially formidable impediment and Freyberg did not want to take the chance that Field Marshal Kesselring might be overruled by his untrustworthy superiors, who might not have been so willing to protect historical monuments after the Italians had defected.
I think in this case the destruction of the monastery could easily and should have been avoided. I understand that in times of war hasty decisions can be made but perhaps on this occasion Freyberg and his officers had put too much faith in the maxim Whoever masters the hills, masters the valleys and neglected to see the consequences of their actions.
