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doesn't know REAL wrestling...
Defeating a Superpower
For those of you who know me even a little, it will not surprise you that I start this thread in antiquity and with a series of military confrontations; specifically those in the years 480-479BCE.
In the latter half of the sixth century BCE, the Persian Empire had conquered all of the major states of the Ancient Middle East Medes, Assyrians, Neo-Babylonians, Jews, Lydians and Egyptians were all part of a vast empire that stretched from the Sahara to the Jaxartes River and from India to the Aegean Sea.
In 515BCE, a third continent had been opened to Persian expansion when Thrace and part of Macedonia. It appeared that nothing could stop the Persian juggernaut particularly when its next opponent was a group of disunited Greek city states that spent more of their time fighting each other. However, not only were these city-states scientifically and tactically advanced but when they were forced to come together in the face of the approaching Persian shadow they could muster significant manpower and resources for the defence of their homeland.
The Persians knew of Greek military potential having been exposed to it a decade previous in 490BCE when an Athenian army routed a Persian force twice its size at the Battle of Marathon (the battle gives its name to the race of modern times as supposedly a certain Pheidippides ran the 26 miles from the battlefield to Athens to warn the city of an approaching Persian fleet; however, this actually does Pheidippides a disservice as he instead ran from Athens to Sparta to ask for aide in the coming battle, covering the 140 miles in two days; it was the Athenian army that raced from Marathon to Athens to defend the city from further attack)
Therefore, the Persians were well prepared for the coming engagements. Despite not coming anywhere near the preposterous numbers recorded, the worst being Herodotus 5,283,220 (Book VII.186), the Persian army the crossed into Europe probably approached 250,000 men while the Persian navy perhaps reached 800 ships. Despite garrison duties in Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly reducing the Persian force to around 150,000 by the time it entered southern Greece, wisely, the Greeks, led on land by the Spartans and on sea by the Athenians, avoided meeting this still monstrous force in open battle.
Instead, they sent a token force of around 8,000 under the command of one of the Spartan kings (there were always two), Leonidas and a contingent of 300 Spartans to delay the Persian army at the narrow Pass of Thermopylae while the Greek fleet engaged its Persian counterpart off the coast, giving the full Greek army time to congregate at the Isthmus of Corinth.
Despite their already fearsome military reputation, the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae were about to achieve legendary status the likes of which few military operations have ever come close. In the narrow pathways of Thermopylae, Leonidas and his men threw back numerous Persian assaults on their position over a period of three days. They were only defeated through the intervention of a Greek traitor called Ephialtes who led part of the Persian army along an hitherto unknown path around the Greek position, defeating a Greek army of 1,000 men on the way. Not wanting to the entire army to be surrounded, Leonidas and his men made the ultimate sacrifice and remained to face the divergent Persian attack (they were not alone as 700 Thespians, 400 Thebans and an unknown number of slaves also remained). After an heroic charge against the Persian lines, during which Leonidas was killed, the remnants of the Spartan led force was mown down by concentrated archer fire. Perhaps only a few Thebans, who surrendered, survived.
Such heroism in the face of such insurmountable odds and certain death has been enhanced by some of the recorded discussions that took place between the Spartans and Persian ambassadors. After explaining the size and majesty of the Persian army, one ambassador asked Leonidas to surrender his arms the Spartan king replied μολὼν λαβέ (molon labe), meaning Come and get them. Another Spartan soldier called Dienekes when informed that Persian archers were so numerous that their arrows would block out the sun, retorted good, then we shall fight in the shade.
The epitaph written by the poet Simonides to the heroes of Thermopylae sums up the Spartan attitude to their sacrifice.
Ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.
Stranger, go tell the Spartans that we keep the ground they bid us hold.
Together with the victory of the Greek fleet at Artemisium, the Persians were slowed down long enough for the Greeks to make proper defensive preparations, including most extraordinarily the almost complete evacuation of Athens. With the Greek army forming a virtually unbreakable line across the narrow Isthmus, the Persians now relied on their fleet to be able to outflank the Greek position.
Learning from the naval engagement at Artemisium where Greek ships proved superior in close quarter fighting to their Persian counterparts, the Athenian general Themistocles employed one of the most spectacular uses of misinformation and bluff in history. Sending a message to Xerxes, he claimed that the Greek command was divided (this was true) and that if the Persians attacked the Greek fleet then the Athenians, who comprised a large portion of the Greek fleet, would defect. Despite opposition from several of his commanders, Xerxes took the bait and ordered his fleet into a strategically disadvantageous position in the narrow Straits of Salamis, where Persian numerical superiority meant little and Greek close quarter superiority meant everything. As they entered the Straits, the Persian vanguard was rammed broadside by the Greek fleet and in the ensuing hand to hand combat; the heavily armed Greek marines swiftly defeated the light armed Persian crews. The rest of the Persian fleet was driven back in disarray into their own ranks sowing further confusion and the Persians lost perhaps a third of their navy.
Having lost their naval superiority, the Persians now found themselves in trouble of being trapped in Europe had the Greeks moved to block the Hellespont. Therefore, Xerxes retired home to Asia leaving his general Mardonius in command of a hand-picked force of around 80,000 to complete the conquest of Greece. Against this force, the Greeks decided to risk pitched battle. On the plains of Plataea, some 37,500 Greek hoplites, including up to 10,000 Spartans, as well as perhaps a similar number of light-armed troops.
After a tense period of stalemate and jostling for position, Mardonius was able to force the Greeks into a strategic retreat by using his superior cavalry to disrupt their food supply lines and spoil a spring that was the main source of the Greeks water. However, Mardonius made the mistake of thinking the Greeks were in full disorderly retreat when they were not. He compounded this mistake by ordering his forces to attack the Greek right flank, which was held by the Spartans and their Tegean allies. Once the Spartans had withstood the barrage from the Persian archers and cavalry, they proceeded to crush the Persian infantry. When Mardonius was killed, the Persian left flank fell apart. Simultaneously, the Greek left flank held by the Athenians won a hard battle against the Persian right comprised of Persian Greek allies, mostly Thebans. Together with the rest of the Greek army that had not seen any fighting, the Spartans and Athenians crossed the river and captured the Persian camp, massacring what remained of Mardonius army.
While they would continue to interfere in Greek politics for the next 150 years, the defeats at Salamis and Plataea brought an end to Persian territorial ambitions in Europe. The significance of this cannot be underestimated. Without Leonidas sacrifice, Alexander the Great may not have marched his way into the history books; had Themistocles bluff been called, it is highly unlikely that the Roman Empire would have ever existed in the continent-shaping form that it did; had the Spartan or Athenian line broken at Plataea, important Greek advances in learning such as the alphabet, democracy and literature may have been lost along with the city of Athens itself; although, rather interestingly, five centuries later the local rabbi Jesus of Nazareth would probably still have been crucified as it was a Persian invention. In general, much of what Ancient Greece would give to the world may have been extinguished with a Persian conquest of Greece in 480-479BCE.
What are your thoughts on this vital period in western history? Have I overestimated its importance?
What other pivotal moments in history are there?
(I promise my next entry will not be military in nature)
For those of you who know me even a little, it will not surprise you that I start this thread in antiquity and with a series of military confrontations; specifically those in the years 480-479BCE.
In the latter half of the sixth century BCE, the Persian Empire had conquered all of the major states of the Ancient Middle East Medes, Assyrians, Neo-Babylonians, Jews, Lydians and Egyptians were all part of a vast empire that stretched from the Sahara to the Jaxartes River and from India to the Aegean Sea.
In 515BCE, a third continent had been opened to Persian expansion when Thrace and part of Macedonia. It appeared that nothing could stop the Persian juggernaut particularly when its next opponent was a group of disunited Greek city states that spent more of their time fighting each other. However, not only were these city-states scientifically and tactically advanced but when they were forced to come together in the face of the approaching Persian shadow they could muster significant manpower and resources for the defence of their homeland.
The Persians knew of Greek military potential having been exposed to it a decade previous in 490BCE when an Athenian army routed a Persian force twice its size at the Battle of Marathon (the battle gives its name to the race of modern times as supposedly a certain Pheidippides ran the 26 miles from the battlefield to Athens to warn the city of an approaching Persian fleet; however, this actually does Pheidippides a disservice as he instead ran from Athens to Sparta to ask for aide in the coming battle, covering the 140 miles in two days; it was the Athenian army that raced from Marathon to Athens to defend the city from further attack)
Therefore, the Persians were well prepared for the coming engagements. Despite not coming anywhere near the preposterous numbers recorded, the worst being Herodotus 5,283,220 (Book VII.186), the Persian army the crossed into Europe probably approached 250,000 men while the Persian navy perhaps reached 800 ships. Despite garrison duties in Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly reducing the Persian force to around 150,000 by the time it entered southern Greece, wisely, the Greeks, led on land by the Spartans and on sea by the Athenians, avoided meeting this still monstrous force in open battle.
Instead, they sent a token force of around 8,000 under the command of one of the Spartan kings (there were always two), Leonidas and a contingent of 300 Spartans to delay the Persian army at the narrow Pass of Thermopylae while the Greek fleet engaged its Persian counterpart off the coast, giving the full Greek army time to congregate at the Isthmus of Corinth.
Despite their already fearsome military reputation, the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae were about to achieve legendary status the likes of which few military operations have ever come close. In the narrow pathways of Thermopylae, Leonidas and his men threw back numerous Persian assaults on their position over a period of three days. They were only defeated through the intervention of a Greek traitor called Ephialtes who led part of the Persian army along an hitherto unknown path around the Greek position, defeating a Greek army of 1,000 men on the way. Not wanting to the entire army to be surrounded, Leonidas and his men made the ultimate sacrifice and remained to face the divergent Persian attack (they were not alone as 700 Thespians, 400 Thebans and an unknown number of slaves also remained). After an heroic charge against the Persian lines, during which Leonidas was killed, the remnants of the Spartan led force was mown down by concentrated archer fire. Perhaps only a few Thebans, who surrendered, survived.
Such heroism in the face of such insurmountable odds and certain death has been enhanced by some of the recorded discussions that took place between the Spartans and Persian ambassadors. After explaining the size and majesty of the Persian army, one ambassador asked Leonidas to surrender his arms the Spartan king replied μολὼν λαβέ (molon labe), meaning Come and get them. Another Spartan soldier called Dienekes when informed that Persian archers were so numerous that their arrows would block out the sun, retorted good, then we shall fight in the shade.
The epitaph written by the poet Simonides to the heroes of Thermopylae sums up the Spartan attitude to their sacrifice.
Ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.
Stranger, go tell the Spartans that we keep the ground they bid us hold.
Together with the victory of the Greek fleet at Artemisium, the Persians were slowed down long enough for the Greeks to make proper defensive preparations, including most extraordinarily the almost complete evacuation of Athens. With the Greek army forming a virtually unbreakable line across the narrow Isthmus, the Persians now relied on their fleet to be able to outflank the Greek position.
Learning from the naval engagement at Artemisium where Greek ships proved superior in close quarter fighting to their Persian counterparts, the Athenian general Themistocles employed one of the most spectacular uses of misinformation and bluff in history. Sending a message to Xerxes, he claimed that the Greek command was divided (this was true) and that if the Persians attacked the Greek fleet then the Athenians, who comprised a large portion of the Greek fleet, would defect. Despite opposition from several of his commanders, Xerxes took the bait and ordered his fleet into a strategically disadvantageous position in the narrow Straits of Salamis, where Persian numerical superiority meant little and Greek close quarter superiority meant everything. As they entered the Straits, the Persian vanguard was rammed broadside by the Greek fleet and in the ensuing hand to hand combat; the heavily armed Greek marines swiftly defeated the light armed Persian crews. The rest of the Persian fleet was driven back in disarray into their own ranks sowing further confusion and the Persians lost perhaps a third of their navy.
Having lost their naval superiority, the Persians now found themselves in trouble of being trapped in Europe had the Greeks moved to block the Hellespont. Therefore, Xerxes retired home to Asia leaving his general Mardonius in command of a hand-picked force of around 80,000 to complete the conquest of Greece. Against this force, the Greeks decided to risk pitched battle. On the plains of Plataea, some 37,500 Greek hoplites, including up to 10,000 Spartans, as well as perhaps a similar number of light-armed troops.
After a tense period of stalemate and jostling for position, Mardonius was able to force the Greeks into a strategic retreat by using his superior cavalry to disrupt their food supply lines and spoil a spring that was the main source of the Greeks water. However, Mardonius made the mistake of thinking the Greeks were in full disorderly retreat when they were not. He compounded this mistake by ordering his forces to attack the Greek right flank, which was held by the Spartans and their Tegean allies. Once the Spartans had withstood the barrage from the Persian archers and cavalry, they proceeded to crush the Persian infantry. When Mardonius was killed, the Persian left flank fell apart. Simultaneously, the Greek left flank held by the Athenians won a hard battle against the Persian right comprised of Persian Greek allies, mostly Thebans. Together with the rest of the Greek army that had not seen any fighting, the Spartans and Athenians crossed the river and captured the Persian camp, massacring what remained of Mardonius army.
While they would continue to interfere in Greek politics for the next 150 years, the defeats at Salamis and Plataea brought an end to Persian territorial ambitions in Europe. The significance of this cannot be underestimated. Without Leonidas sacrifice, Alexander the Great may not have marched his way into the history books; had Themistocles bluff been called, it is highly unlikely that the Roman Empire would have ever existed in the continent-shaping form that it did; had the Spartan or Athenian line broken at Plataea, important Greek advances in learning such as the alphabet, democracy and literature may have been lost along with the city of Athens itself; although, rather interestingly, five centuries later the local rabbi Jesus of Nazareth would probably still have been crucified as it was a Persian invention. In general, much of what Ancient Greece would give to the world may have been extinguished with a Persian conquest of Greece in 480-479BCE.
What are your thoughts on this vital period in western history? Have I overestimated its importance?
What other pivotal moments in history are there?
(I promise my next entry will not be military in nature)